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I. INTRODUCTION
Beneficiaries sometimes wish to vary the terms of a trust
that does not expressly authorize a variation. Commonly, the
problem arises because the settlor did not anticipate the circum-
stances now facing the beneficiaries. Except in limited situa-
tions, the courts approve variations only reluctantly.'
In 1958 the English Parliament relieved some of the practi-
cal problems facing beneficiaries by enacting the Variation of
Trusts Act.2 The Act permits a court to authorize variations in
the distributive provisions of a trust. Under this Act, a court
may approve an arrangement on behalf of minor, disabled,
unborn, or unascertained beneficiaries if it finds that the
arrangement will benefit such persons.3 Ontario has enacted sim-
1. See generally 2 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 167 (3d ed. 1967).
2. English Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 53.
3. The English Act provides:
1.(1) Where property, whether real or personal, is held on trusts arising,
whether before or after the passing of this Act, under any will, settlement or
other disposition, the court may if it thinks fit by order approve on behalf of-
(a) any person having, directly or indirectly, an interest, whether
vested or contingent, under the trusts who by reason of infancy or
other incapacity is incapable of assenting, or
(b) any person (whether ascertained or not) who may become enti-
tled, directly or indirectly, to an interest under the trusts as being at
a future date or on the happening of a future event a person of any
specified description or a member of any specified class of persons, so
however that this paragraph shall not include any person who would
be of that description, or a member of that class, as the case may be,
if the said date had fallen or the said event had happened at the date
of the application to the court, or
(c) any person unborn, or
(d) any person in respect of any discretionary interest of his under
protective trust where the interest of the principal beneficiary has
not failed or determined,
any arrangement (by whomsoever proposed, and whether or not there is any
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ilar legislation.4
In 1983 Missouri became the first state to enact legislation,
patterned after the English Act, that permits courts to approve
trust variations.5 Under the Missouri statute, the court can
approve variations that reallocate the relative shares of the ben-
eficiaries either by reducing the shares of some beneficiaries and
increasing those of others or by terminating the trust earlier
than indicated by the trust terms.'
This Comment argues that similar legislation would be
desirable in Washington.7 Even though the proposed statute
would entail a substantial deviation from the common-law rule,
the resulting benefits justify the change. This Comment also
examines the retroactive application of variation of trusts stat-
utes and concludes that a retroactive application is constitu-
tional. A requirement that courts consent 8 on behalf of the bene-
other person beneficially interested who is capable of assenting thereto) vary-
ing or revoking all or any of the trusts, or enlarging the powers of the trustees
of managing or administering any of the property subject to the trusts:
Provided that except by virtue of paragraph (d) of this subsection the
court shall not approve an arrangement on behalf of any person unless the
carrying out thereof would be for the benefit of that person.
English Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 53, § 1, sched. 1.
4. ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 519 (1980).
5. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.590(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
6. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.590(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985) provides:
When all of the adult beneficiaries who are not disabled consent, the court
may, upon finding that such variation will benefit the disabled, minor, unborn,
and unascertained beneficiaries, vary the terms of a private trust so as to
reduce or eliminate the interests of some beneficiaries and increase those of
others, to change the times or amounts of payments and distributions to bene-
ficiaries, or to provide for termination of the trust at a time earlier or later
than that specified by the terms.
7. In March 1984 the Washington Legislature passed a statute authorizing nonjudi-
cial resolution of trust disputes. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96.170 (Supp. 1984). This section
allows beneficiaries to enter into a written agreement concerning trust disputes. A per-
sonal representative may be appointed to represent minor, incompetent, disabled,
unborn, or unascertained beneficiaries. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96.170(2) (Supp. 1984).
The statute authorizes the special representative to enter into a binding agreement on
behalf of such beneficiaries. This statute, however, is not as broad as a variation of trusts
statute because it appears that the statute will be used when resolving disputes rather
than merely because the beneficiaries want the proposed variation. The provision
became effective on January 1, 1985.
8. Note that the Missouri statute does not authorize the court to "consent" on
behalf of the beneficiaries but instead provides that the court may "vary" the terms of
the trust only when the court finds that the variation benefits the disabled, minor,
unborn, or unascertained beneficiaries. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.590(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
The decision not to use the word "consent" may have been in recognition that under
Missouri common law the beneficiaries of a trust may not terminate a trust, even when
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ficiaries only when the variation benefits the beneficiaries in
some manners sufficiently protects the beneficiaries' constitu-
tional interests under the contract clause10 and the due process
clause11 of the federal Constitution. Finally, this Comment pro-
poses that a Washington variation of trusts statute include: (1) a
provision directing the court to consider the settlor's intentions
before approving a requested variation, to maintain the stability
of trusts validly created under Washington law; (2) a provision
for separate representation for minor, disabled, unborn, or unas-
certained beneficiaries, to ensure that their interests are accu-
rately represented to the court; and (3) a provision directing
costs to be charged to adult beneficiaries when a variation is
denied, to discourage frivolous trust litigation.
II. BACKGROUND
The majority common-law rule followed by Washington
courts permits a court to authorize a variation from the terms of
a trust if, because of circumstances unknown or unanticipated
by the settlor, compliance with the original trust provisions
would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the
trust's purposes. 2 Under this rule, the court asserts equitable
all the beneficiaries consent, when the termination would thwart the settlor's intentions.
Evans v. Rankin, 329 Mo. 411, 422, 44 S.W.2d 644, 649 (1931). For example, when a trust
provides for the support or education of a beneficiary, the court will not allow a trust to
be terminated unless the trust purpose is first accomplished, even if a beneficiary con-
sents. Gross v. Gross, 625 S.W.2d 655, 667-68 (Mo. App. 1981).
By contrast, in England a trust may be terminated or modified by the consent of all
the beneficiaries even though the trust purposes have not been accomplished. Saunders
v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, 115 (1841). Consequently, the language in the English Variation
of Trusts Act, 1958, quoted supra note 3, allowing courts to "approve on behalf' of bene-
ficiaries unable to consent, would be sufficient to cover the situations in which the bene-
ficiaries are unable to consent. See 4 A. Scorr, supra note 1, § 337, at 2655-56 for a
discussion of the English rule.
9. Under the Missouri statute, the court may authorize a variation only "upon find-
ing that such variation will benefit the disabled, minor, unborn, and unascertained bene-
ficiaries." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.590(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. Donnelly v. National Bank of Wash., 27 Wash. 2d 622, 625, 179 P.2d 333, 334
(1947). In Donnelly, the settlor had expressed the intention in his will to give his grand-
son $750 a year to enable the grandson to complete his collegiate and professional educa-
tion. The settlor established a time limit, however, providing that the payments were to
end on Dec. 31, 1945. The court extended the time limit because the grandson had been
called to serve in the armed forces, a circumstance that was unforeseen by the settlor. Id.
at 627-28, 179 P.2d at 335-36. See also Esmieu v. Schrag, 92 Wash. 2d 535, 539-40, 598
P.2d 1366, 1369 (1979) (approving Donnelly).
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power to vary only the administrative provisions of the trust."3
The court may authorize the trustee to sell, lease, mortgage, or
improve trust property, or to invest trust funds in specified ways
even when the trust terms expressly or impliedly deny these
powers to the trustee. 14 Nevertheless, the nonstatutory authority
of the courts to permit a trustee to deviate from the terms of a
trust is restricted. First, a change in circumstances must occur
that was unforeseen by the settlor.15 Second, the trustee must
demonstrate not only that the deviation would benefit the trust
or the beneficiaries but also that a failure to deviate would
impair the accomplishment of the trust's purposes. 6 Third,
without statutory authorization a court cannot permit deviation
from the trust terms in a manner that benefits some benefi-
ciaries at the expense of others.' 7
In 1925 Parliament enacted legislation that eliminated the
first two restrictions in England by authorizing the court to
empower the trustee to perform any act of administration
deemed expedient.18 A number of states have enacted legislation
resembling the 1925 English Act. 19
13. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 146, at 521
(5th ed. 1973). See also Esmieu v. Schrag, 92 Wash. 2d 535, 539-40, 598 P.2d 1366, 1369
(1979) (authorizing a diversification of trust assets for administrative purposes).
14. 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 1, § 167, at 1267-69; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
167, at 351 (1959). The Washington statute recognizes this judicial authority. WASH. REV.
CODE § 11.100.040 (Supp. 1984). For example, suppose a settlor creates a trust of a hotel
for the purpose of paying income to members of the settlor's family. The trust terms
prohibit the trustee powers of sale and mortgage. Yet, if the hotel burns down and the
trustee cannot produce income without a sale or mortgage, a court of equity could confer
on the trustee the power to sell or mortgage. See also Donnelly v. National Bank of
Wash., 27 Wash. 2d 622, 625, 179 P.2d 333, 334 (1947) (following RESTATEMENT OF
TRUSTS § 167, at 415 (1935)).
15. Donnelly v. National Bank of Wash., 27 Wash. 2d 622, 625, 179 P.2d 333, 334
(1947); 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 1, § 167, at 1268.
16. Donnelly v. National Bank of Wash., 27 Wash. 2d 622, 625, 179 P.2d 333, 334
(1947) (following RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 167, at 415 (1935)); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT,
supra note 13, § 146, at 522. See also Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Younger, 4 Cal. 3d
202, 211-12, 481 P.2d 222, 228, 93 Cal. Rptr. 214, 220 (1971) (deviation from the trust
terms was unjustified because there was no reason to believe that the circumstances were
unforeseen or that the purposes of the trust would be defeated if the variation were
denied). See generally Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 1228 (1971) (alteration of or deviation from
express trust power).
17. See Bright v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 30 Cal. 2d 285, 293, 182
P.2d 565, 572 (1947) (citing RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 168 comment d (1935) (now
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 168 comment d (1959))).
18. Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 19, § 57. The Missouri Legislature also
adopted this provision. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.590(1) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
19. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1120.2 (West 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B: 14-24
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Courts of equity in this country do not have the power to
vary the relative shares of the beneficiaries.20 The courts have
refused to make such variations on the theory that a court has
the duty to carry out the intentions of the settlor unless the
trust provisions violate settled principles of public policy.21 This
restrictive doctrine often prevents the authorization of varia-
tions that would benefit the beneficiaries when the variations are
not essential to carry out the purposes of the trust.22
Several exceptions to this common-law doctrine exist, but
they fail to cover many situations. For example, one exception
provides that when the settlor is the sole beneficiary of a trust
and has the legal capacity to revoke the trust, the settlor can
revoke the trust even though the original trust purposes have
not been accomplished. 3 Because most trusts are created for
persons other than the settlor, however, this exception rarely
applies. Another exception allows the settlor to revoke a trust if
all the beneficiaries consent, even if the trust purports to be
irrevocable.24 This exception provides no relief, however, when
the settlor is deceased or when certain beneficiaries are legally
incapable of consenting because they are minor, disabled,
unborn, or unascertained.25 Variation of trusts statutes solve this
(West 1983); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-1.1(c) (McKinney 1967); UNIFORM
TRUSTEES' POWERS ACT § 5(a) (1964). The Washington statute provides: "Nothing con-
tained in this chapter shall be construed as restricting the power of a court of proper
jurisdiction to permit a fiduciary to deviate from the terms of any will, agreement, or
other instrument relating to the acquisition, investment, reinvestment, exchange, reten-
tion, sale, or management of fiduciary property." WASH. REv. CODE § 11.100.040 (Supp.
1984).
20. See, e.g., Stewart v. Hamilton, 151 Tenn. 396, 399, 270 S.W. 79, 80 (1925);
Annot., 39 A.L.R. 37, 40 (1925). See generally G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 13, §
146.
21. E.g., Shelton v. King, 229 U.S. 90, 101 (1913) ("There is no higher duty which
rests upon a court than to carry out the intentions of a testator when the provision is not
repugnant to settled principles of public policy and is otherwise valid.").
22. Id. The Court in Shelton refused to terminate a trust to allow the appellants,
who had vested and indefeasible interests in the trust legacies, to use the income from
the trust before the youngest reached age 25. The only duty placed on the trustee was to
"lock the fund up" until the youngest reached 25, the age stated in the trust instrument.
Id. at 92 (referring to brief for appellants).
23. Hall v. Malstrom, 29 Wash. 2d 746, 749, 189 P.2d 471, 473 (1948); 4 A. SCOTT,
supra note 1, § 339, at 2694.
24. 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 1, § 338, at 2687.
25. See Bright v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 30 Cal. 2d 285, 294-95, 182
P.2d 565, 572-73 (1947). The court in Bright refused an advancement to a life beneficiary
who needed money because she was ill. Id. The court refused to make the advancement
because the interests of contingent beneficiaries might be reduced, id., arguing that sym-
pathy for the needs of the life beneficiary would not empower the court to deprive the
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problem by permitting the court to consent on behalf of those
beneficiaries who are incapable of consenting. The underlying
theory is that the court, upon a determination that the variation
will benefit the minor, disabled, unborn, or unascertained bene-
ficiaries, will make the decision that the beneficiaries would have
made if they had been competent adults.2"
Variation of trusts statutes can solve a wide range of
problems, depending on specific trust terms and the specific
needs of the trust beneficiaries. For example, variation of trusts
statutes have been used to create tax savings,27 to advance
money to life beneficiaries in need,28 to increase the trustees'
investment powers,2 9 to eliminate unfair restrictions on benefi-
ciaries,30 to equalize benefits to children born after the creation
of a trust,31 and to redistribute trust assets among the benefi-
ciaries so that each beneficiary can make the best use of his or
her trust assets.3 2
III. PROTECTING THE SETTLOR'S INTENT
Under the common law of Washington and throughout the
United States, courts have taken special care to carry out the
intentions of the settlor in trust litigation.3 In Shelton v.
King,s4 the United States Supreme Court upheld the trustee's
refusal to terminate a trust, saying: "There is no higher duty
which rests upon a court than to carry out the intentions of a
testator when the provision is not repugnant to settled princi-
ples of public policy and is otherwise valid."35
A settlor who creates a trust under valid state law wants.
assurance that the trust will be carried out substantially as the
residuary beneficiaries of their interests in the trust. Id. at 295, 182 P.2d at 573. The
contingent beneficiaries in Bright were incapable of consenting to the variation because
they were minor and unborn. Id. at 287, 182 P.2d at 568.
26. Albery, Modern Developments in Equity Law and Variation of Trusts Act, 6
REAL PROP. PROB. AND TR. J. 504, 510 (1971).
27. Chapman v. Chapman, [1959] 1 W.L.R. 372, 374.
28. In re Rouse's Will Trusts, [1959] 1 W.L.R. 374, 374.
29. In re Coates' Trusts, [1959] 1 W.L.R. 375, 378.
30. Hooper v. Wenhaston, [1970] 1 Ch. 560, 567.
31. In re Zekelman, 19 D.L.R.3d 652, 654 (1971).
32. Wilson v. Holt, [1968] 1 Ch. 100, 117-18.
33. See, e.g., Donnelly v. National Bank of Wash., 27 Wash. 2d 622, 625, 179 P.2d
333, 334 (1947) (following RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 167, at 415 (1935)). See supra note
12 and accompanying text.
34. 229 U.S. 90 (1913).
35. Id. at 101.
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settlor intended.36 Under present common law, when the court
allows an administrative change in a trust, the court does so only
to accomplish the real intent and purpose of the settlor. 7 Simi-
larly, the court should consider the settlor's intentions before
authorizing a variation in the relative shares of the beneficiaries.
Any variation that destroys the underlying purpose of the trust
should be denied. Without this protection, trusts would cease to
be useful devices for settlors because a settlor would have no
assurance that the trust purposes would be carried out once the
settlor relinquished control over the trust.
The economic theory behind upholding the settlor's inten-
tions is that settlors will be encouraged to accumulate wealth if
they have control over their property."8 The countervailing argu-
ment, however, is that trust beneficiaries should receive the
maximum benefit from the trust property. A variation of trusts
statute would allow beneficiaries to take advantage of opportuni-
ties that would otherwise be unavailable, by allowing the benefi-
ciaries more freedom to use trust property without unnecessary
restrictions.3 In analyzing the settlor's intent, the court should
36. Bright v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 30 Cal. 2d 285, 295, 182 P.2d
565, 573 (1947). The court in Bright refused to allow an invasion of the trust corpus to
aid testatrix's daughter, even though the daughter suffered from a disease believed to be
incurable and had special medical needs. Id. The disease had arisen after the creation of
the trust. Id. at 287, 182 P.2d at 567. The court followed the common-law rule disallow-
ing variations in the distributive provisions of a trust, reasoning that to allow the varia-
tion would amount to taking property from one beneficiary and giving it to another. Id.
at 293, 182 P.2d at 571. The court emphasized that "[slympathy for the needs of the
respondents does not empower the court to deprive the residuary beneficiaries of their
interests in the corpus of the trust without their consent." Id. at 295, 182 P.2d at 573.
The court explained that upholding the settlor's intentions is necessary, for otherwise
"there would be no stability to any testamentary trust in this state." Id.
37. Esmieu v. Schrag, 92 Wash. 2d 535, 539, 598 P.2d 1366, 1369 (1979). In Esmieu,
the court permitted a variation in order to carry out the settlor's intent. Id. The varia-
tion allowed a diversification of the trust assets and was administrative only. Id. at 536,
539, 598 P.2d at 1367, 1369. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 13, § 146, at 521.
See also supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text for an explanation of administrative
variations.
38. Jones, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in DEATH TAXES AND FAMILY
PROPERTY, ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 120 (E. Halbach ed. 1977). See also
Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 139, 145 (1936) (noting that one
purpose in allowing a testator freedom to dispose of property is that "[tihere would be
no incentive to ingenuity, productiveness and thrift unless a man could direct the enjoy-
ment of his property").
39. See Scott, Control of Property of the Dead. II, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 632, 654 (1917).
See also L. SILK, ECONOMICS IN PLAIN ENGLISH 57 (1978), in which the author explains
the efficiency of choice: "To economize is to choose. Each individual must choose how
best to satisfy his wants by allocating his limited time and energy to different uses and
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consider that the settlor's primary intent is to benefit the benefi-
ciaries named in the trust. If the beneficiaries collectively can
use the trust fund in a more efficient manner, the court can
determine whether the settlor would have acquiesced if the set-
tlor had foreseen the future events.
Most courts in this country would probably consider the
settlor's intentions with or without statutory direction. Never-
theless, a legislature adopting a variation of trusts statute should
avoid ambiguity by including language in the statute directing
the courts to consider the settlor's intentions before authorizing
a variation. Such statutory protection might also encourage set-
tlors to state their primary intentions and purposes in trust doc-
uments to aid later judicial interpretations.
Several English decisions interpreting the Variation of
Trusts Act40 illustrate how the settlor's intentions can be
ignored without a specific statutory mandate. Early decisions
under the Act indicated that the court should consider the
wishes of the settlor when evaluating a proposed variation.4
Yet, in Hooper v. Wenhaston,4' the court approved a variation
that clearly defeated the settlor's expressed intention.43 The
trust in that case contained a forfeiture provision cutting off
beneficiaries who practiced Roman Catholicism."' The benefi-
ciaries requested the court to delete the forfeiture provision.45
Even though the deletion would defeat the settlor's expressed
intentions, the court authorized the variation because it bene-
fited the beneficiaries and because the variation was a "fair
by distributing his income among the goods and services he wants to buy." See generally
Fratcher, Fiduciary Administration in England, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 12, 38 (1965).
40. English Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 53, § 1.
41. In re Steed's Will Trusts, [1960] 1 Ch. 407, 413. In In re Steed's, the court
refused a variation that "cut at the root of the testator's wishes and intentions." Id. at
422. See also In re Burney's Settlement Trusts, [1961] 1 W.L.R. 545. In In re Burney's,
the court granted a proposal to convert a husband's reversionary interest, which is a
"protective" life interest, into an absolute life interest, noting that the court should con-
sider the proposal as a whole, "taking into account the purpose of the trust and the
intention of the settlor." Id. at 550. The court determined that the settlor could not have
intended to provide benefits for a second wife of the husband or benefits for the issue of
the husband's second marriage when the evident purpose of the trust was to protect the
settlor's husband, as the father of the settlor's family, and for the benefit of that family.
Id.
42. [1970] 1 Ch. 560.
43. Id. at 567.
44. Id. at 562.
45. Id. at 563.
46. Id. at 567. The court said that the proposed arrangement would have three pos-
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and proper one."'47 The fact that the variation defeated the set-
tlor's intentions was held to be "serious but by no means conclu-
sive."48 The court held that these particular forfeiture provisions
were undesirable and that their deletion was therefore fair and
proper. 9 The court did not offer general guidelines for a deter-
mination of when the settlor's intentions could be disregarded,
but the court focused instead on the needs of the beneficiaries.5 0
Perhaps the Hooper decision was justified on the grounds
that the forfeiture provisions violated public policy, yet the
opinion is ambiguous. In the United States, courts will disregard
the settlor's intentions when those intentions clearly violate
public policy. 1 Without further clarification, the English courts
might conclude that the settlor's intentions need not be consid-
ered. To avoid such an interpretation, a variation of trusts stat-
ute should contain language requiring the court to consider the
settlor's intentions when the intentions do not violate public
policy.
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF A VARIATION OF TRUSTS
STATUTE
A. Tax Savings
A variation of trusts statute has several practical applica-
tions. One familiar problem arises when a settlor creates a trust
without knowledge of the tax consequences. 52 The English Act
sible benefits: (1) the beneficiaries would not be deterred from practicing Roman Cathol-
icism; (2) the beneficiaries would not be deterred from marrying someone who practiced
that faith; and (3) family dissension would be reduced by the distribution of benefits
without regard to religious beliefs. Id. at 566-67.




51. A. Scorr, ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 62.13 (1960). See, e.g., Colonial
Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 286, 135 A. 555, 564 (1926). In Brown, the court held
that a provision in a trust restricting the leases of the trust property to one year and
prohibiting any promises of longer leases and another provision that directed "that no
new buildings [be] placed upon the Exchange Place property and the homestead shall
exceed three stories in height" violated public policy, as the provisions constituted
unreasonable restrictions that "would carry a serious threat against ... proper growth."
Id. at 284, 135 A. at 564. The court also noted that the provisions were disadvantageous
to the beneficiaries and that "they are designed to benefit no one, and are harmful to all
persons interested." Id. at 286, 135 A. at 564.
52. See, e.g., Chapman v. Chapman, [1959] 1 W.L.R. 372, 374 (settlor was unaware
of the tax consequences when he set up the trust).
634 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 8:625
was enacted chiefly to allow taxpayers to arrange their transac-
tions to minimize the tax consequences." Often, subsequent
changes in tax laws defeat the settlor's original plan, even
though the settlor had carefully created the trust to minimize
tax consequences. Variation of trusts statutes allow the court to
rearrange the shares to minimize taxes.5 4 The court merely
allows the beneficiaries to do what they otherwise would be able
to do if all of the beneficiaries were legally capable of consenting
to a variation initiated by the settlor. Under current common
law, a variation would not be authorized if the variation was
unnecessary to fulfill the trust purposes or if certain trust bene-
ficiaries were incapable of consenting to the variation. 5
For example, suppose that a third party created an irrevoca-
ble trust to pay income for life to a married couple, A and B,
and then to pay the whole trust fund to C and D, the children of
A and B. Assume that C and D are both seventeen years old and
are planning to attend college. Assume also that the settlor, una-
ware of the tax consequences, set up the terms of the trust so
that all of the income was required to be distributed currently to
A and B. Under section 652 of the Internal Revenue Code of
53. See Albery, supra note 26, at 509.
54. See Chapman v. Chapman, [1959] 1 W.L.R. 372, 374 (court permitted a varia-
tion under the Variation of Trusts Act to minimize the tax).
55. See supra notes 21 & 23-25 and accompanying text. A settlor under current
common law may be able to have a trust modified or revoked if the court finds that the
settlor was induced by a mistake regarding tax consequences. 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 1, §
333.4, at 2634. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 333, at 149 (1959), which
provides that: "A trust can be rescinded or reformed upon the same grounds as those
upon which a transfer of property not in trust can be rescinded or reformed."
One court allowed a rescission of a gift on the ground that the settlors had made a
mistake of law as to the tax consequences of the creation of a trust, when the sole pur-
pose of setting up the trust was to minimize taxes. Stone v. Stone, 319 Mich. 194, 198-
200, 29 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1947). Yet, the Michigan court denied a rescission when mini-
mizing tax consequences was not the settlor's sole purpose in setting up the trust. Lowry
v. Kavanagh, 322 Mich. 532, 544, 34 N.W.2d 60, 65 (1948). Thus, the mistake-of-law
rationale may not be sufficient in cases in which the settlor has not set up a trust for the
sole purpose of minimizing taxes. In addition, the mistake-of-law rationale will not work
when the settlor did not even consider the tax consequences of the creation of a trust.
Some courts may also refuse a reformation after the death of a settlor. See
Rentmeister v. DeSilva, 553 P.2d 411, 412 (Utah 1976). Nevertheless, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court did allow a reformation after the settlor's death when the trust
omitted a provision for a marital deduction because of a clerical error, and when the
mistake could be proved by full, clear, and decisive proof. Berman v. Sandler, 379 Mass.
506, 509-11, 399 N.E.2d 17, 19-20 (1980). A variation of trusts statute could allow the
beneficiaries to take advantage of tax benefits regardless of whether the settlor was alive
or whether a mistake of law concerning tax consequences could be proved.
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1954 (I.R.C.)," if A and B use the income to pay for the college
education of C and D, A and B will be taxed on the income.
Section 652 provides that income that is required to be distrib-
uted currently under I.R.C. section 65157 will be included in the
gross income of the beneficiaries to whom the income is required
to be distributed, whether distributed or not. A and B would not
want to renounce completely their interests under the trust, but
they would like to change the trust terms so that the income
used for the education of C and D would be taxed to C and D.
Under a variation of trusts statute, A and B, as adult benefi-
ciaries, could request that the court approve a variation allowing
the trustee to use discretion in making distributions to A and B
and allowing the trustee to distribute money to C and D for
their college educations. This variation would prevent A and B
from being taxed on the portion of the income distributed to C
and D under I.R.C. section 652.58
Note that this variation does not change the tax laws. It
merely allows the beneficiaries to take advantage of the current
tax laws. A and B are not getting a tax break without sacrifice in
this example; they are relinquishing some control over the
income to achieve the desired result.
The court could easily find that C and D, as minor benefi-
ciaries, benefit from this variation. The variation would allow
money to be advanced to C and D for their education. This edu-
cational benefit would outweigh the disadvantage created by the
tax on the income distributed to C and D. Under common law,
this variation could not be accomplished because C and D would
be unable to consent and because the variation would not be
necessary to carry out the essential trust purposes.
If the settlor is still alive, the court could determine whether
the settlor's intent would be thwarted by the proposed variation,
either by asking the settlor or by requiring the settlor to consent
to the variation. If the settlor is dead, the variation of trusts
statute should direct the court to examine the trust to determine
56. I.R.C. § 652 (1984).
57. I.R.C. § 651 (1984).
58. I.R.C. § 652 (1984). This example assumes that A and B have no support obliga-
tion under local law to pay for the college education of C and D. If A and B did have an
obligation to provide such support, then they would still be taxed on the income. A per-
son will be treated as a beneficiary of income when the income is used to satisfy a per-
son's legal obligation. I.R.C. § 643(c) (1984). See Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4 (1984) for a
definition of legal obligation. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.643(c)(1) (1984).
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whether the variation would interfere with any express or
implied purpose of the trust. If the court finds that the settlor's
primary purpose was to benefit A and B, the court should find
that this proposed variation, initiated by A and B, will have a
beneficial result. The court should therefore authorize the varia-
tion. If, on the other hand, the court determines that the pro-
posed variation somehow violates the settlor's purpose in setting
up the trust, the court should deny the variation.
B. Advancement of Trust Funds When Remote Contingent
Beneficiaries Exist
Variation of trusts statutes could solve another common
problem by permitting an advancement of trust funds to current
beneficiaries before the time designated in the trust instrument.
The advancement could be permitted when the court finds that
minor, disabled, unborn, or unascertained beneficiaries would
reap some compensating advantage from the variation. Under
current common law, advancement is usually denied because
advancement is unnecessary to fulfill the purposes of the trust
and because the minor, disabled, unborn, or unascertained bene-
ficiaries are unable to consent to the variation.5 9 A variation of
trusts statute would create greater flexibility for such
advancement.
The compensating advantage need not be financial, accord-
ing to the English and Ontario interpretations.8 The benefit
may be financial, educational, social, or any other kind of bene-
fit."' The court must also be satisfied that the arrangement is
fair and proper.6 2
For instance, in In re Zekelman,3 the Ontario court, follow-
ing the English courts' interpretations, held that the benefit
need not be financial. The court found that if the time of vesting
59. Bright v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 30 Cal. 2d 285, 295, 182 P.2d
565, 573 (1947) (beneficiaries did not have the legal capacity to consent).
60. See In re C.L., [1968] 1 All E.R. 1104. In In re C.L., relatives of a mental patient
petitioned for a variation that would eliminate the mental patient's life interest in a
trust in order for the relatives to realize eventual savings in estate duty. Id. at 1106.
Although the court acknowledged that this arrangement would not benefit the patient-
beneficiary financially, the court nevertheless approved the variation, finding that it was
the type of variation that the patient would have consented to, had she been able to,
because it would create substantial savings for her family. Id. at 1109.
61. Hooper v. Wenhaston, [1970] 1 Ch. 560, 566.
62. Id. at 567.
63. 19 D.L.R.3d 652 (1971).
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of the beneficiaries' interests were accelerated, there would be
two possible benefits. First, family dissension would be reduced
because the variation would eliminate discrimination among the
settlor's children. Second, the variation would probably reduce
taxes. 4
Consider the following example of a variation that acceler-
ates certain beneficiaries' interests. Suppose that a settlor cre-
ates a trust for his daughter, A, and his son-in-law, B, upon their
marriage. The trust terms provide that the trust fund is to accu-
mulate income until A and B reach fifty, when the fund will be
transferred to them or to the survivor. The trust terms also pro-
vide that if both A and B die before the age of fifty, then the
accumulated fund will pass to their issue per stirpes on the
death of the survivor. Assume that both A and B are now forty-
five years old and that they have two children, X and Y. Assume
also that Y is blind and needs an eye operation. Under a varia-
tion of trusts statute, if the family cannot afford to pay for the
operation, the variation could be granted. A, B, X, and Y, as
adult beneficiaries, could petition the court to release enough
money from the trust corpus to pay for the operation. Under the
common law, however, the advancement of income would not be
permitted because unborn contingent beneficiaries might have
their shares reduced by the proposed variation. These unborn
contingent beneficiaries, whose potential existence is highly
improbable, are incapable of consenting to this arrangement.
Under a variation of trusts statute, the court would be
required to consider the different classes of beneficiaries who
might eventually be entitled to the trust fund and to determine
whether all of the different classes of beneficiaries would benefit
from the proposed arrangement.65 For example, the English
court in Eliot-Cohen v. Cohen66 refused to authorize an arrange-
ment in which there was a possibility that a remote great-
grandchild would take nothing under the agreement.6 7 The court
later approved the arrangement with an amendment stipulating
that in the event the unlikely contingency occurred, the trustees
would compensate the beneficiaries.6"
Thus, in the present example, the court would have to con-
64. Id. at 654.
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sider the possibility that A and B would have additional chil-
dren and that both A and B might die before they reach the age
of fifty. Even though A and B are both forty-five years old and
do not plan to have any more children, most states will presume
that they might have more children. 9 The court would also have
to consider the consequences if, after the operation, either X or
Y marries and has a child and then A, B, X, and Y all die before
A and B reach the age of fifty. In both hypothetical situations,
the recently born beneficiaries would have been deprived of part
of the trust because of the premature expenditure of the trust
corpus for the operation. Before the court can consent on behalf
of these beneficiaries, the court must find that these benefi-
ciaries will gain some advantage by the proposed variation.
If the dollar amount that a contingent beneficiary stands to
lose is great, the court might authorize a variation only on the
condition that A, B, X, and Y agree to secure the contingent
beneficiaries' interests with an insurance policy or a bond.70 If
the contingent beneficiaries are then born and are entitled to the
trust, money will be available to compensate for the portion of
the trust fund used prematurely. The court should approve the
variation if it finds that a contingent beneficiary, as a reasonably
prudent person, would consent to the variation if the beneficiary
had the capacity to do so.71
The court must also consider the settlor's primary intent in
setting up the trust, either by asking the settlor, if the settlor is
living, or by examining the terms of the trust. In the present
situation, the court would probably find that the settlor's pri-
mary intent was to benefit A and B by making a large sum avail-
able as they reached retirement. Yet, the court could also deter-
mine that the settlor would have favored an advancement of the
trust funds if the settlor had been aware of the circumstances
facing A and B.
In summary, a variation of trusts statute permits the
69. Some states treat the presumption that anyone is capable of bearing children
until death as conclusive only in perpetuities cases. The presumption is usually rebutta-
ble as to termination of trusts, although the cases are divided on this point. See 4 A.
ScoTT, supra note 1, § 340.1, at 2714 & n.4. See also Betchard v. Iverson, 35 Wash. 2d
344, 351, 212 P.2d 783, 787 (1949) (holding in a perpetuities case that the presumption is
conclusive); 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 72 (1975).
70. Some courts have allowed modifications of contingent interests when these
interests could be secured with a bond or insurance. See Frank v. Frank, 153 Tenn. 215,
218, 280 S.W. 1012, 1013 (1925); Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 1281, 1293 (1964).
71. See Wilson v. Holt, [1968] 1 Ch. 100, 112.
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advancement of trust funds when the contingent beneficiaries
would directly benefit or when the contingent beneficiaries'
interests could be adequately protected.
V. COSTS OF LITIGATION
The English, Ontario, and Missouri variation of trusts stat-
utes do not specify who should pay legal costs incurred under a
variation of trusts suit. The question arises whether the
expenses incurred to employ guardians ad litem or attorneys to
represent the minor, disabled, unborn, or unascertained benefi-
ciaries would be paid by the adult beneficiaries, out of trust
funds, or out of the personal assets of the minor, disabled,
unborn, or unascertained beneficiaries. To avoid later disputes a
variation of trusts statute should specify who should bear this
burden.
The general rule is that attorneys' fees or costs are not
allowable absent either statutory authority or an agreement of
the parties. 72 The courts of equity make certain exceptions, how-
ever, in suits seeking the construction of wills or trusts.73
Generally, expenses incurred by beneficiaries in suits
against the trustee are properly chargeable against the trust
when the suit is brought to preserve or to benefit the trust.7'
Similarly, when a trustee properly incurs expenses in applying
for court instructions concerning administration of a trust, the
court will allow the trustee to pay these expenses out of the
trust.76 The trustee is also entitled to indemnity for expenses if
the trustee has benefited the trust estate in good faith.76
Similarly, under a variation of trusts statute, if the pro-
posed arrangement benefited the trust, the court might allow the
litigation costs to be paid out of the trust. On the other hand, if
72. Mellor v. Chamberlin, 100 Wash. 2d 643, 649, 673 P.2d 610, 613 (1983) ("In
Washington attorney fees may be recovered only when authorized by a private agree-
ment of the parties, a statute, or a recognized ground of equity."). See Annot., 30
A.L.R.2d 1148, 1150 (1953) (" 'Costs' are statutory allowances to a party to an action for
his expenses incurred therein.").
73. Wool v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 89 Ill. App. 3d 560, 563, 411 N.E.2d 1135, 1138
(1980) (e.g., courts will make exceptions "when there is an honest difference of opinion
as to the meaning of the maker's language").
74. Id. at 564, 411 N.E.2d at 1139. The court in Wool held that the benefit conferred
in seeking to obtain control over the trustees was a benefit personal to the beneficiaries,
and not a benefit to the trust. Id. at 565, 411 N.E.2d at 1139.
75. 3 A. Scorr, supra note 1, § 188, at 1525 & § 259, at 2214-15.
76. Id.
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the application for a variation is denied because the court finds
that the application was brought in bad faith or that the varia-
tion would not benefit the minor, disabled, unborn, or unascer-
tained beneficiaries, the court might order the plaintiffs (the
adult beneficiaries) to pay the litigation costs. This flexible solu-
tion would discourage frivolous suits under a variation of trusts
act. The legislature should specifically authorize costs to be paid
according to these equitable rules.
77
VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF
VARIATION OF TRUSTS STATUTES
A variation of trusts statute that closely follows the English
Act would apply both prospectively and retroactively. The Eng-
lish Act applies to trusts arising "before or after the passing of
the Act."'78  Similarly, the Missouri statute provides that
"[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided in the terms of the
trust, the provisions of . . . this chapter apply to any trust
established before or after September 28, 1983, and to any trust
asset acquired by the trustee before or after September 28,
1983."79
Prospective application of a variation of trusts statute does
not offend the Constitution because a state may define the rights
to receive, enjoy, and dispose of property as the state sees fit.s0
77. The current Washington guardian ad litem statutes provide some flexibility.
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.88.090, .92.180 (1983 & Supp. 1984). Section 11.92.180 provides
that a guardian or limited guardian shall be allowed such compensation for services as
the court shall deem just and reasonable. Section 11.88.090(6) provides that the fee for
the guardian shall be paid by the incompetent or disabled person unless the court finds
that such payment would result in substantial hardship to such person, in which case the
county will be responsible for such costs. If, however, the petition is found to be frivolous
or not brought in good faith, the guardian fee shall be charged to the petitioner. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96.140 (Supp. 1984), which states that "[e]ither the superior court
or the court on appeal, may, in its discretion, order costs, including attorneys fees, to be
paid by any party to the proceedings or out of the assets of the estate, as justice may
require." See also WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.150 (1983), which provides:
In [an] action prosecuted or defended by an executor, administrator, trustee of
an express trust, or a person expressly authorized by statute, costs shall be
recovered as in an action by or against a person prosecuting in his own right,
but such costs shall be chargeable only upon or collected of the estate of the
party represented, unless the court shall direct the same to be paid by the
plaintiff or defendant personally, for mismanagement or bad faith in such
action or defense.
78. English Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 53, § 1, sched. 1.
79. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.600 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
80. See Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942) (rights to succession to
property are statutory in nature, and nothing in the federal Constitution forbids a state
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Once the state extends the right to a settlor to create a trust,
however, the issue arises whether a retroactive"' modification of
that trust offends either the contract clause 2 or the due process
clause83 of the United States Constitution. 4
A review of United States Supreme Court decisions reveals
that the Court generally considers three factors when determin-
ing whether to uphold a retroactive statute under both the con-
tract and due process clauses: (1) the nature of the abrogated or
modified right; (2) the extent of modification or abrogation; and
(3) the strength of the public interest served by the statute.8 5
Variation of trusts statutes serve an important public inter-
est by promoting the efficient use of trust property.8 6 A variation
of trusts statute will not substantially impair contract rights if
the settlor's intent is considered,87 nor will there be a substantial
deprivation of property if the court consents only to variations
that truly benefit the beneficiaries.88
Three categories of interests may be altered or eliminated
by a variation of trusts statute: (1) the settlor's interests; (2) the
interest of unascertained and contingent beneficiaries;8 9 and (3)
legislature from limiting, conditioning, or even abolishing the rights of succession to
property within the court's jurisdiction).
81. A retroactive statute is one that gives conduct occurring before the passage of an
act a different legal effect than it would have had without the passage of the statute.
Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73
HAtv. L. REV. 692, 692 (1960).
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
84. See Scott, supra note 39, at 654 (discussing the public policy against restraints
on alienation).
85. Hochman, supra note 81, at 697. Some commentators argue that retroactive leg-
islation violates the Constitution if the legislation abrogates vested rights. Id. at 696.
This explanation proves unsatisfactory because it is not always clear what constitutes a
vested right. One circular definition of a vested right is that a right is vested when it has
been so far perfected that it cannot be taken away by statute. Id. Constitutional analysis
is further complicated because not all retroactive impairment of even clearly vested
rights will violate the Constitution. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.
1, 17 (1976). See infra text accompanying notes 109-15 for a brief explanation of the
facts in United States Trust.
86. See Scott, supra note 39, at 646. Public policy favors allowing beneficiaries of
trusts to have maximum enjoyment from trust property, much as public policy favors
limiting restraints on alienation. See supra text accompanying note 39. Nevertheless, the
courts, in absence of a statute, enforce the whim of the testator unless the provision
violates public policy. Scott, supra note 39, at 648.
87. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
89. This Comment will not analyze the unborn beneficiaries' interests under the
Constitution in view of the United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade, 410
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the interests of minor and disabled beneficiaries who are certain
to take an interest in the trust. These interests will be evaluated
according to the nature of the property interests, the extent of
the modification or abrogation, and the strength of the public
interest served by the statute."
A. The Settlor's Interests and the Contract Clause
Commentators argue that even though a settlor has no nat-
ural right to create a trust,9' once the state grants the settlor the
right to create a trust, a contract right is created that is pro-
tected from legislative encroachment. 2 The Supreme Court held
in Coolidge v. Long93 that trust deeds are contracts within the
meaning of the federal contract clause."4 Yet, the Coolidge Court
gave no rationale for its conclusion.
One plausible explanation is that a trust is a kind of con-
tract between the settlor and the trustee. Like the terms of a
contract, the terms of the trust document control.95 The trustee
is under an obligation to carry out the terms of the trust,96 just
as a party to a contract is under an obligation to carry out the
terms of a contract.
Even assuming that a trust is a contract within the meaning
of the federal contract clause, it does not necessarily follow that
a retroactively applied variation of trusts statute violates the
U.S. 113 (1973). The Court held that the word "person" as used in the 14th amendment
does not include the unborn. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. Yet courts are likely to protect the
interests of unborn beneficiaries, even without a constitutional mandate, just as courts
protect contingent beneficiaries' interests to fulfill the settlor's intent. See infra text
accompanying notes 128-30.
90. Hochman, supra note 81, at 697.
91. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942).
92. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 590, at 472 n.3 (3d ed. 1915).
93. 282 U.S. 582 (1931).
94. Id. at 595. Contra Adams v. Cook, 15 Cal. 2d 352, 361, 101 P.2d 484, 489 (1940)
(rule prohibiting judicial modification of the terms of a contract does not apply to the
declarations of trust when the primary purpose of the trust would not be accomplished
and when the advantages would not accrue to the beneficiaries by "a slavish adherence
to the terms of the trust").
95. See Note, Trusteeship in Modern Business, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 1052 (1929).
96. Normally, the trust instrument constitutes the measure of the trustee's powers.
The usual view of a trust is that of a fiduciary relationship between the settlor and the
trustee. See 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 11, §§ 10, 11, 77
(1974); 1 A. SCOTT, supra note 1, § 14.3, at 149-51. The analysis under the contract clause
is illustrative, nevertheless, of possible constitutional objections to variation of trusts
statutes. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank Am. Trust Co. v. Baxter, 207 Cal. App. 2d 818, 831,
24 Cal. Rptr. 872, 880 (1962).
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contract clause. In a leading contract clause case, Home Build-
ing & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,9 7  the United States
Supreme Court emphasized that the prohibition against the
impairment of contracts is not an absolute one.9 8 In Blaisdell,
the Court held that the economic interests of the state may jus-
tify the exercise of state power notwithstanding the retroactive
interference with contracts.9 The Court stated that the proper
test of constitutionality is whether the legislation is addressed to
a legitimate public end and whether the measures taken are rea-
sonable and appropriate to that end.'
The statute' 01 at issue in Blaisdell authorized special judi-
cial proceedings permitting the postponement of foreclosures
and execution sales "for such a time as the court may deem just
and equitable."'0 2 Aside from the extension of time, the other
conditions of redemption remained unaltered. 03 While the
mortgagor remained in possession of the property, the mortgagor
had to pay the reasonable rental value determined by the
court.'0 4 The Supreme Court found that the legislation was rea-
sonable because the mortgage obligation was not substantially
impaired'05 and because the period of redemption was merely
extended.' 06
Recently, in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,10 7 the
Supreme Court approved the Blaisdell analysis. The Allied
Court said that if impairment results in only a minimal altera-
tion of contractual obligations, the inquiry need not extend fur-
ther; there is no violation of the contract clause.10 8
97. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
98. Id. at 428.
99. Id. at 427-28.
100. Id. at 438.
101. Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act, 1933 Minn. Laws 514.
102. 290 U.S. at 416.
103. Id. at 425.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 445.
106. Id.
107. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
108. Id. at 235. The Allied Court struck down a Minnesota statute, the Private Pen-
sion Benefits Protection Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 181B.01-.17 (1974), which imposed a "pen-
sion funding charge" on private employers with 100 employees or more if the private
employer terminated the plan or closed a Minnesota office. 438 U.S. at 238. The Act
imposed a charge if pension funds were insufficient to cover full pensions for all employ-
ees who had worked at least 10 years. Id. Allied Structural Steel began closing its Minne-
sota office in 1974 and brought an action for injunctive and declaratory relief, declaring
that the Act unconstitutionally impaired contractual obligations to its employees under
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In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,"9 the Court
reaffirmed the Blaisdell analysis but concluded that the extent
of abrogation went too far, and the Court consequently struck
down the statute.110 The statute in issue repealed a 1962 cove-
nant between New York and New Jersey that limited the ability
of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to subsidize
rail passenger transportation from revenues and reserves."' The
appellees argued that repeal of the statute was necessary to
encourage the use of mass transportation. " The repeal would
allow the states to raise bridge and tunnel tolls and to use the
revenues to subsidize improved commuter railroad service. "
The Court noted that the extent of the abrogation was great
because the statute repealed an important security provision
without compensating the bondholders. " 4 In addition, the Court
rejected the public interest justification, stating that the repeal
of the covenant was neither necessary to the achievement of the
goals nor reasonable." 5
The foregoing decisions indicate that a variation of trusts
statute will not offend the contract clause if impairment of the
contract obligation is minimal and if the variation serves a valid
public interest. A variation of trusts statute can be justified as
necessary to protect the social and economic interests of the
state." 6 Under a variation of trusts statute, the court can
authorize changes in a trust that would allow trust funds to be
used in the most effective manner. Beneficiaries who have spe-
cial need for trust funds or who can save taxes can take advan-
tage of opportunities that would otherwise be unavailable. Vari-
ation of trusts statutes ensure that the use of trust property will
Allied's pension agreement. Id. at 239-40. The Supreme Court struck down the Act, rea-
soning that the Act's effect on Allied's contractual obligation was severe, id. at 246, sud-
den and unanticipated, id. at 249, and not purportedly enacted to deal with a broad,
generalized economic or social problem. Id. at 250.
109. 431 U.S. 1 (1976).
110. Id. at 32.
111. Id. at 3.
112. Id. at 5-6.
113. Id. at 29.
114. Id. at 18 n.15.
115. Id. at 29.
116. For example, the Washington Legislature updated Washington's trust legisla-
tion and justified the legislation as "necessary for the immediate preservation of the pub-
lic peace, health, and safety, the support of the state government and its existing public
institutions." 1984 Wash. Laws ch. 149, § 180, at 730. This illustrates that the Washing-
ton Legislature deems trust legislation in the public interest.
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not be unnecessarily restricted and thereby result in a less than
optimum use of property by the living generation." 7 The United
States Supreme Court recognizes that it is each state's responsi-
bility to determine what legislation protects the social and eco-
nomic welfare of the state's citizens 18 and, therefore, the Court
defers to the state legislative determination of what is necessary
to accomplish legitimate public ends." 9
The extent of alterations of trusts under a variation of
trusts statute will usually be minimal in the sense that whenever
a variation reduces a beneficiary's share, the court will ensure
that the beneficiary is better off or has been compensated in
some fashion. Any variation should be minimal if the court con-
siders the underlying purpose of the trust before granting a vari-
ation. Although existing variation of trusts statutes do not spe-
cifically require the court to take into account the purposes of
the trust, a court should not authorize variations that defeat the
primary purpose of a trust.' When an alternative variation
would provide the same benefits for the beneficiaries without
straying as far from the settlor's purposes, then the court should
approve the alternative variation. If the courts consider the set-
tlor's intentions when applying a variation of trusts statute, the
reasonableness of the statute will be increased because the
impairment of the trust terms will be minimal.
In summary, under current constitutional decisions, altera-
tions of trusts will not violate the settlor's contract rights
117. See generally Fratcher, supra note 39, at 38 (discussion of the benefits of the
trustees' and courts' powers in England).
118. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1976).
119. Id.
120. See Note, Variation of Private Trusts in Response to Unforeseen Needs of
Beneficiaries: Proposals for Reform, 47 B.U.L. REV. 567, 580 (1967), in which the com-
mentator suggests that "[p]reservation of this freedom requires at least that the testa-
tor's 'real intent' should prevail over a rigidly conceptualistic application of legal defini-
tions in the name of certainty." The commentator also discusses the ability of the courts
to distinguish between a settlor's primary (or general) intent and the settlor's secondary
intent. Id. at 582.
In determining a settlor's intentions, a court may be "ascertaining not what the set-
tlor actually intended in regard to a particular matter but what he would have intended
if he had thought about the matter." Scott, Deviation from the Terms of a Trust, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (1931). Thus, in Petition of Wolcott, 95 N.H. 23, 27, 56 A.2d
641, 644 (1948), the court determined that the settlor's primary intent was to provide
reasonable support to his widow, and the settlor's secondary intent was to benefit the
remaindermen. The court noted that "[tlhe remaindermen are deprived of no rights so
long as rights which the life tenant was intended to have are not exceeded." Id. at 27, 56
A.2d at 641.
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because alterations will serve a legitimate public interest in effi-
cient use of trust funds or trust property and because the altera-
tions will be minimal; the alterations will neither defeat the set-
tlor's primary intent nor deprive beneficiaries without providing
a corresponding benefit.
B. Contingent Beneficiaries' Interests and Substantive Due
Process
In Blaisdell, the Supreme Court indicated that the same
factors determine whether a retroactive statute violates the due
process clause as determine whether a statute violates the con-
tract clause.'21 Thus, a statute allowing a modification of contin-
gent interests will not offend the due process clause of the Con-
stitution if the public interest is furthered by the modification
and if the statute provides a reasonable method to achieve this
public interest.'22
Some courts have held that a right must be more than a
mere expectation to be protected under the contract clause and
the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
According to this view, the property right must be a title, legal
or equitable, to enforce a legal demand in the present or future
or to be exempt from a demand of another. 23 Thus, it can be
argued that contingent interests, because they are only expecta-
tions, are not vested and can be constitutionally eliminated
without additional analysis. The better view, followed by most
modern courts, 24 is that if the public interest in modifying these
interests outweighs their value, then the courts can modify these
interests without violating the Constitution.'25
A variation of trusts statute similar to the English and Mis-
souri statutes would give the court the power to eliminate com-
pletely a contingent beneficiary's interest under a trust. 26 A
court in these jurisdictions cannot authorize the variation, how-
ever, unless it finds that the contingent beneficiary will be better
121. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 445 (1934).
122. See Hochman, supra note 81.
123. See generally 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estates § 6 (1975). See also Love v. McDonald,
201 Ark. 882, 886, 148 S.W.2d 170, 173 (1941).
124. See infra notes 151 & 153-54 and accompanying text.
125. Sparks, Future Interests, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 420 (1957).
126. The Missouri statute permits the courts to "vary the terms of a private trust so
as to reduce or eliminate the interests of some beneficiaries and increase those of
others." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.590(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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off under the variation. 2 7 Thus, even though the court might
constitutionally modify contingent interests given the proper
circumstances, the court has no statutory authority to modify
contingent interests unless the court can ensure that the contin-
gent beneficiary receives some compensating advantage.
Traditionally, courts under the common law have protected
contingent interests in order to carry out the settlor's intentions.
For example, the court in Stewart v. Hamilton28 refused to
advance money for the maintenance of a living beneficiary
because the shares of contingent beneficiaries might have been
reduced as a result. 2 9 The court noted that "[t]he necessities of
the present life tenant cannot be satisfied at the expense of some
other object of the trustor's bounty.""
Several states'' have upheld the constitutionality of legisla-
tion cancelling or modifying possibilities of reverter and powers
of termination. These interests are similar to the interests of
contingent beneficiaries because possibilities of reverter and
powers of termination may never become vested interests if the
proper conditions do not occur.
In Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf,32 the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld a statute that limited possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry to a period of fifty years.1 33 If fifty years had
already passed since the creation of these interests, the statute
gave the holders of the interests one year from the effective date
of the act to enforce their rights. 3 4 The court held that a possi-
bility of reverter under Illinois law was nothing more than a
mere "expectation" and was thus subject to legislative modifica-
tion or abolition. 35 The public interest was served, according to
the Batdorf court, by eliminating clogs on titles. 36 The court
found that possibilities of reverter removed property from the
mortgage market long after the individual, social, and economic
127. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
128. 151 Tenn. 396, 270 S.W. 79 (1925).
129. Id. at 401, 270 S.W. at 80.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 Il1. 2d 486, 493, 130 N.E.2d 111, 115
(1955); Hiddleston v. Nebraska Jewish Educ. Soc'y, 186 Neb. 786, 791, 186 N.W.2d 904,
907 (1971). See also L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FuTuRE INTERESTS § 1994 (2d ed.
1956). See generally Annot., 87 A.L.R.3d 1011 (1978).
132. 6 Il1. 2d 486, 130 N.E.2d Ill (1955).
133. Id. at 493, 130 N.E.2d at 115.
134. Id. at 490, 130 N.E.2d at 113.
135. Id. at 491, 130 N.E.2d at 114.
136. Id. at 492, 130 N.E.2d at 114.
648 University of Puget Sound Law Review
reasons for their creation had ceased. 13 7 In balancing the inter-
ests of the public against those of the holders of the reverter
interests, the court deferred to the legislative finding that the
economic value of possibilities of reverter was outweighed by the
inconvenience and expense caused by their continued
existence."3 8
In addition, the Batdorf court held that the extent of the
abrogation under the Illinois statute was slight. 39 The statute
merely shortened the time within which a suit could be brought
to enforce the possibilities of reverter and powers of termina-
tion.140 The statute still allowed a reasonable time to enforce
these rights.14 1
The Washington Supreme Court, in dicta, has supported
the view that possibilities of reverter are subject to legislative
modification. In Gillis v. King County,42 the court held that
property interests similar to possibilities of reverter were mere
expectations and therefore could be defeated by statute. 43
Other state courts have held that statutes cancelling pos-
sibilities of reverter violate the due process clause and the con-
tract clause of the United States Constitution.1 4 4 In Biltmore
Village v. Royal, 45 the Florida Supreme Court struck down a
statute cancelling all reverter provisions in plats and deeds that
had been in effect for more than twenty-one years.14' The court
137. Id. at 492, 130 N.E.2d at 114-15.
138. Id. at 492, 130 N.E.2d at 115.
139. Id. at 493, 130 N.E.2d at 115.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 42 Wash. 2d 373, 255 P.2d 546 (1953).
143. Id. at 378, 255 P.2d at 549 (alternative holding). In Gillis, a statute provided
that publicly dedicated streets would be vacated for public use for a period of five years.
Id. at 375, 255 P.2d at 547. The plaintiffs in Gillis were abutting landowners who
claimed that they had vested rights under the statute. Id. The defendant, King County,
defended the action by citing a 1909 amendment that eliminated the automatic vacation
when the public dedication was recorded in any plat. Id. at 375-76, 255 P.2d at 548. The
plaintiffs argued that the 1909 provision did not apply to the dedication in question
because the dedication was made prior to the amendment. Id. at 376, 255 P.2d at 548.
The court compared the rights granted under the original statute to possibilities of
reverter and held that the rights were based on a mere expectancy that depended on a
street remaining unopened for a five-year period. Id. at 377-78, 255 P.2d at 549. The
street in question had only remained unopened for three years. Id. at 377, 255 P.2d at
548. The court determined, therefore, that the plaintiffs did not have vested rights when
the amended statute was enacted. Id. at 378, 255 P.2d at 549.
144. See generally Annot., 87 A.L.R.3d 1011 (1978).
145. 71 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1954).
146. Id. at 729.
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held that the statute violated the contract clause and the due
process clause of the federal Constitution.'4 7 The statute con-
tained a clause that gave the holders of these rights one year
from the date of the enactment to enforce their rights."18 The
court found, however, that the one-year provision would be inef-
fective to protect a holder's rights when a breach of the condi-
tion did not occur within that year.""
The divergent results may be explained by the degree of
impairment permitted under these statutes. The statute in
Batdorf allowed the holders a longer period to enforce the possi-
bility of reverter than did the statute in Biltmore. Thus, under
the analysis in Blaisdell, 50 the severity of impairment was
greater in Biltmore than in Batdorf and required that the stat-
ute be struck down.
In a recent case, Hiddleston v. Nebraska Jewish Education
Society,'' the Nebraska Supreme Court confronted the consti-
tutionality of limiting possibilities of reverter and followed the
BlaisdeIl' 52 approach. In Hiddleston, the court held that the
constitutionality of a retroactive statute depends on the nature
and strength of the public interest in the legislation, the extent
of the modification, and the nature of the right affected by the
statute.6 3 The court found that the Nebraska statute limiting
possibilities of reverter to thirty years was reasonable because,
while the value of the possibilities was slight, the public interest
in the marketability of titles was substantial.' 54 The court also
found that the methods authorized by the statute were certain,
uniform, and inexpensive. 5 Overall, the statute met the Blais-
147. Id. at 728-29.
148. Id. at 729.
149. Id. See also Board of Educ. v. Miles, 259 N.Y.S.2d 129, 15 N.Y.2d 364, 207
N.E.2d 181 (1965). The Miles court considered the validity of a statute similar to the
statute in Biltmore. The statute, N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 345 (1958), required a holder of
a contingent power of reverter to record the interest on or before Sept. 1, 1961, if the
date of creation was prior to Sept. 1, 1931. Id. at 136-37, 15 N.Y.2d at 373, 207 N.E.2d at
186. Although the court did not pass on the constitutionality of the section, id. at 136, 15
N.Y.2d at 372, 207 N.E.2d at 186, the court invalidated the statute as a statute of limita-
tions because the statute purported to bar the remedy before the right to enforce a
power of reverter had matured. Id. at 137, 15 N.Y.2d at 374, 207 N.E.2d at 187.
150. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). See supra notes 97-
115 and accompanying text.
151. 186 Neb. 786, 186 N.W.2d 904 (1971).
152. Id. at 790, 186 N.W.2d at 906.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 791, 186 N.W.2d at 907.
155. Id.
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dell constitutionality test."'
These decisions indicate that a properly applied variation of
trusts statute will not violate the due process clause. The public
has a substantial interest in the most efficient use of trust prop-
erty.157 In addition, because the court must find either that the
variation benefits the beneficiaries or that some other compen-
sating advantage is given to the beneficiary, the severity of
impairment of contingent interests will be minimal.
C. Minor and Disabled Beneficiaries' Interests and
Substantive and Procedural Due Process
The constitutionality of variation of trusts statutes must be
evaluated with respect to the modification of property rights of
minor or disabled beneficiaries. An evaluation of the nature of
the abrogated or modified right, the extent of the abrogation or
modification, and the strength of the public interest served by
the statute 158 reveals that a variation of trusts statute does not
violate minor or disabled beneficiaries' due process rights.
Although minor and disabled beneficiaries may have vested
interests in the trust property, the public interest in allowing the
most efficient use of the trust favors modification of these prop-
erty interests. The modification of the minor or disabled benefi-
ciaries' interests will be minimal, as it is with contingent benefi-
ciaries, because the court must ensure either that the trust
variation directly benefits them or that they are compensated in
some fashion.
A variation of trusts statute must also meet the standards
for procedural due process to avoid conflict with the due process
clause. Procedural due process requires that when a deprivation
of life, liberty, or property is threatened, the interested parties
must be given reasonable notice of the pendency of the action. 159
In addition, the parties must have an opportunity for a hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case, given at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.160 The requirements for procedural
due process will be met under a variation of trusts statute if the
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 7 & 86 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 97-115 and accompanying text.
159. See Olympic Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chausee Corp., 82 Wash. 2d 418, 422, 511
P.2d 1002, 1005 (1973); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).




interests of minor or disabled beneficiaries, as well as those of
contingent beneficiaries, are properly represented by counsel in
court.
English courts often require that separate counsel be pro-
vided on behalf of the minor, disabled, unborn, or unascertained
beneficiaries for whom the court consents.""1 When the court
finds that the interests of adult beneficiaries are substantially
the same as the interests of the minor, disabled, unborn, or
unascertained beneficiaries, however, the court does not require
separate representation.1 62 Similarly, under the common law in
Washington and in most other states, courts of equity have the
power to bind all persons holding property interests of either a
vested or a contingent nature who are either before the court or
who are represented by parties before the court who hold similar
interests. 163
Separate representation for the minor, disabled, unborn, or
unascertained beneficiaries ensures that the court will be
informed of all relevant factors concerning the proposed varia-
tion. Without separate representation, the court may be misled
by the assertions of adult beneficiaries requesting the variation.
Adult beneficiaries, seeking to increase their own shares of the
trust at the expense of others, may invent reasons why a varia-
tion will benefit unrepresented beneficiaries. Proper representa-
tion will ensure that the courts consent on behalf of minor, dis-
abled, unborn, and unascertained beneficiaries only when the
beneficiaries directly benefit or where some alternative compen-
161. See Eliot-Cohen v. Cohen, [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1229, 1231 (the minors in Cohen
were represented by separate counsel). See also In re Rouse's Will Trusts, [1959] 1
W.L.R. 374, 375, in which the court said, "[elverybody, including the trustees and the
next of kin should be separately represented by counsel. I am not suggesting that the
solicitors are not competent to represent persons with varying interests but it is desirable
that counsel appear in a critical mood so that the whole picture is before the court."
162. In re Munro's Settlement Trusts, [1963] 1 W.L.R. 145, 146.
163. See, e.g., Newell v. Ayers, 23 Wash. App. 767, 771-72, 598 P.2d 3, 6 (1979)
(guardian ad litem found unnecessary under WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.050 when minors
had common interests with the defendants who had competent counsel). See generally
59 Am. JUR. 2D Parties § 68 (1971). When the interests are not so similar, courts will
appoint a guardian ad litem to ensure that the interests of minor, disabled, unborn, or
unascertained beneficiaries are adequately represented. See Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank,
361 F.2d 559, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Some states expressly authorize the courts to appoint
a guardian ad litem. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 11.96.170(2) (Supp. 1984), which pro-
vides that a "personal representative or trustee may petition the court for the appoint-
ment of a special representative to represent a person interested in the estate or trust"
and that "[t]he special representative may be appointed for more than one person or
class of persons if the interests of such persons or class are not in conflict."
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sation is provided.
VII. CONCLUSION
Variation of trusts statutes do not violate either the con-
tract clause or the due process clause of the United States Con-
stitution because the public interest in allowing these variations
is great, while impairment of the various interests is slight.
Impairment is slight because the court will consider the settlor's
intentions when evaluating a proposed variation and because the
court will only consent to a variation when the minor, disabled,
unborn, or unascertained beneficiaries will benefit. Conse-
quently, the Washington Legislature should consider the bene-
fits of adopting a variation of trusts statute. The statute should
contain a provision directing costs to be charged to the adult
beneficiaries when a variation is denied and a provision for sepa-
rate representation for the interests of minor, disabled, unborn,
or unascertained beneficiaries.
Decisions under the English and Ontario statutes suggest
that Washington would be well served by a variation of trusts
statute allowing the court to consent on behalf of minor, dis-
abled, unborn, or unascertained beneficiaries. A variation of
trusts statute would allow the court to vary a trust to meet
changes in the tax law, to alleviate problems unanticipated by
the settlor, to advance trust funds to needy beneficiaries, or to
eliminate other common problems facing beneficiaries. A varia-
tion of trusts statute serves the public interest by allowing the
most efficient use of trusts. Often, such variations would better
fulfill the intentions of the settlor than would the original terms
of the trust.
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